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at his description had been sent to every railway
station in France, with an order for his arrest in the event of his
return.

Some months later, after the fall of the Commune, Mr Bradlaugh once
more set out for Paris; he was again arrested at Calais, and this time
kept prisoner for nearly three days, but was then released and allowed
to proceed on his journey. The Commissaire at Calais showed him the
order signed by Jules Favre in the previous April. It was emphatic and
unequivocal, and ran thus: "Empechez à M. Bradlaugh d'entrer à Paris
à tout prix."[148] This document had apparently never been cancelled,
hence Mr Bradlaugh's second arrest. He was never afterwards hindered
on his way to the French capital, although, during the Presidency of
Monsieur Thiers, his movements while in Paris were carefully watched.
At one time the French authorities assumed that he was masquerading
under the name of "Lord Campbell," and the late Lord Campbell and
Stratheden, who used to visit at the house of one of my father's
friends in Paris, was made quite unhappy by having his movements
watched by detectives intended for Mr Bradlaugh. The situation was not
without its amusing side, for the particular business upon which Lord
Campbell was engaged just then was connected with a marriage he wished
to contract with a young French lady.

[Footnote 148: Prevent Mr Bradlaugh from entering Paris, at any price.]

After the fall of the Commune, London was full of French refugees, many
of whom were in poverty and distress. My father did his utmost to help
them; he never had money to give away, but he did then what he always
did in cases needing pecuniary help--he gave a lecture on their behalf.
As his views upon the Commune and the French situation were stated in
some detail, I quote a few of the more important passages from a report
of his lecture which appeared in his own paper.[149] He had taken for
his subject "French Republicanism;" and after he had dealt with the
proclamations of the Republic in 1792 and 1848, and the declaration of
the 4th of September, he said:--

[Footnote 149: _National Reformer_, Dec. 24, 1871]

"Coming now to the 18th March, and the Commune, the audience would
remember that he had in that hall, within a few hours of that date,
guarded himself from any expression for or against a movement which
appeared then to have but slight confidence in its own leaders, and
which had at that date issued no programme. In judging it now, he
should judge it more favourably than he did then, trying to avoid alike
the exaggeration of its foes, and the indiscriminating endorsement
of its friends. It was charged against the men of Paris that they
commenced with the assassinations of Generals Lecomte and Clement
Thomas--no one could justify these assassinations--but if this were
to form ground for the condemnation of the Commune, which disclaimed
all participation in the act, with how much more force would other
forms of government fall under the same condemnation. Napoleon I.
shot the Duc d'Enghien in a ditch; Louis XVIII. shot Marshal Ney;
and although, according to the laws of France, capital punishment for
political offences had been abolished, the present Government shot
Cremieux, Rossel, Ferri, and Bourgeois. He did not justify or excuse
the shooting of the Generals; but those who condemned it should see
whether their own hands were clean. Of the latest shootings he hardly
dared trust himself to speak. M. Thiers had sheltered himself behind
a Committee of Pardons, although he feared that it would not be an
incorrect guess to hazard that M. Thiers' own influence had hindered
any commutation. He considered the 18th March a fatal mistake, a sad
blow to the prospects of Republicanism. The Commune asked for the
recognition and consolidation of the Republic. But he denied their
right to do that by force of arms. They had great provocation, for
they had seen Republicanism and Garibaldi insulted at Bordeaux; they
knew that the majority of the Chamber were Legitimist and Orleanist,
that M. Thiers was Republican only in name, and that Prussia even had
been intriguing to put Henry V. on the throne.... But did the Commune
initiate the struggle of force? The people of Paris had arms: they had
these under the Constitution; they took other arms, to which also they
claimed a Constitutional right. It was due to Thiers' weakness and want
of capacity that there was any struggle for the cannon on Montmartre,
or perhaps at all. He treated the men of Paris as rebels, ignoring that
he was the chief of the executive power of a government of rebellion,
unendorsed by any vote of the country. He refused all overtures of
peace in a manner unworthy a man in his position, and availed himself
of iron, steel, famine, and a worse than Prussian bombardment, to
drive to frenzy men whom it might have been possible to win at an
earlier stage by judicious negotiation.... It was not wonderful that
the Commune fell. There was a demon of suspicion, division, and even
treachery amongst prominent men, and the terrible demoralisation of the
masses, resulting from their position and the long continuance of the
previous siege. The wonder was that it stood so long. It was remarkable
how free the city was from common crime. There were, in all the Avenue
Montaigne, only some two or three concierges left in charge, and all
the property was as safe at the end of the siege as at the beginning.
The rent of a first floor in one of those houses was £1000 a year, the
furniture in proportion. Yet there was no pillage, as there would have
been under almost any other Government, with houses left deserted
by their owners. But it was said that the hostages were shot and the
buildings were burnt. Now he would be the last to utter one word of
justification or defence. He trusted that he might never have to take
part in an armed revolution. He believed that if in such a case it was
proposed that the public buildings of our city should be destroyed,
as those of Paris had been, he would kill without mercy the man who
would attempt it. The only thing that could be said was that the men
of Paris were ringed round with fire and steel, and all hope of mercy
was shut out. To keep them in, Papal Zouaves on the one side, Prussian
bayonets on the other. No quarter offered, no generous word of pardon
spoken. It could not be wondered if in madness they committed those
crimes. It was cruel and cowardly to kill the hostages, but was it for
the Versailles troops to reproach the Commune with that? The madness
of cruelty had been great on both sides, and the criminality was the
greater on the part of the stronger.... The cry of vengeance raised
[against the _bourgeoisie_] was criminal, it was also a blunder; for if
nothing was to be done until the middle class was exterminated, then
hope was impossible; it never could be exterminated. There should be no
question of war in any political movement between the working and the
middle classes.... A policy of conci

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