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viz. the extension of the Evidence Amendment Act of 1869. The suit,
begun in 1867, was not finally disposed of until 1870, but during these
years the side issue of the competency of an Atheist to give evidence
involved so much fighting that my father actually lost about fifteen
hundred pounds before it was decided in his favour.

As endorser of three bills of exchange, Mr Bradlaugh brought an action
against Mr De Rin as acceptor of the same. The bills were drawn in
Brussels, and sent for acceptance to the defendant in England; he
accepted, and afterwards endorsed them to a legal gentleman named
Gallet, who in turn endorsed them in France to Mr Bradlaugh. The action
was brought by the latter to enable him to realise the bills in this
country, and was heard before Mr Justice Montague Smith and a common
jury, in the Court of Common Pleas, in December 1867. Mr Lumley Smith
was counsel for the plaintiff; Mr D. Keane, Q.C., and Mr Wood were for
the defendant.

When Mr Bradlaugh entered the witness-box Mr Keane interposed, saying:
"I have a most painful duty to perform, and that is to object to the
witness being sworn on account of his being an Atheist and holding
notoriously Atheistic opinions." Mr Keane repeated that he felt it an
extremely painful duty, but that he had no discretion in the matter;
he had instructions to take this objection, and therefore he must take
it. He added: "At the same time I must say that I have met Mr Bradlaugh
several times on business, and have never seen any conduct on his part
unbecoming a gentleman."

Mr Justice Smith: "You have power, Mr Keane, to waive the objection.
Sometimes it is material to make the objection considering the matters
in issue. But in the present case is it so? I consider this a case in
which the objection had better be waived."

As counsel against Mr Bradlaugh in the Devonport case, Mr Montague
Smith, Q.C., had himself examined Mr Bradlaugh upon his opinions, but
this he considered altogether a different matter; this was purely a
commercial transaction.

Mr Bradlaugh stated that he was ready to affirm or to give evidence
upon oath, and after a short discussion Mr Justice Smith said that
he should take it upon himself to allow him to affirm; but Mr Keane
again interposed, urging that he would not be competent to do so. Mr
Bradlaugh then made his counsel formally tender him as a witness, but
after some conversation Mr Keane agreed to admit the facts which Mr
Bradlaugh was to prove. It was then contended that the endorsement was
not valid according to the law of France, but ultimately the verdict
was given for the plaintiff, with leave to the defendant to move the
verdict for him on the objections he had raised.

Mr De Rin accordingly moved the Court of Common Pleas, and in July
1868 the Court granted a rule absolute to enter the verdict for the
defendant, on the ground that the endorsement did not confer on the
plaintiff the right of suing on the bills in this country. Mr Bradlaugh
appealed against this decision to the Court of Exchequer, and the Court
of Appeal suggested an inquiry as to the fact whether the endorsed
bills came into Mr Bradlaugh's possession by post in England or
whether they were handed to him in France, and Mr S. Prentice, Q.C.,
was nominated as a referee to ascertain the fact. When the case came
on appeal before Mr Justice Lush in October 1868, in the Exchequer
Chamber, bail had to be given for costs, and Mr Austin Holyoake was
tendered as such bail, but Mr Wood, counsel for the defendant De Rin,
objected to Mr Holyoake as not competent to take the oath. "I am known
to be a Freethinker," wrote Austin Holyoake, with just indignation,
"and it is therefore competent for any solicitor or barrister to openly
insult me by calling in question my ability to speak the truth."

After a very long delay, in December 1869 the case came before Mr
Prentice to ascertain, as I have said, whether the bills were delivered
to Mr Bradlaugh in England or in France. Once more Mr Bradlaugh
presented himself as a witness, to prove their delivery to him in
England, and once more, despite the passing of the Evidence Amendment
Act in the previous August, his evidence was objected to. Mr Bradlaugh
appeared in person, and Mr Wood, who had been counsel for the defendant
at the hearing before Mr Justice Lush, again appeared for him. On
Mr Bradlaugh tendering himself as witness, Mr Wood--who, like his
predecessor Mr Keane, said that, acting under special instructions,
he took a course which gave him considerable pain--asked him: "Do you
believe in God?"

Mr Bradlaugh's objection to answer this question was followed by a long
discussion, at the end of which Mr Prentice held that he was bound to
answer. Again Mr Wood put the question: "Do you believe in God?"

Mr Bradlaugh: "I do not; that is, I do not believe in any being
independent of the universe, governing or ruling it."

Mr Prentice: "Do you believe in a future state of rewards and
punishments?"

Mr Bradlaugh: "After death, certainly not."

"Then," said Mr Prentice, "I must refuse your evidence."

A day or so later my father, undaunted, carried his case before Mr
Justice Brett at Judges' Chambers, and asked for an order to compel
Mr Prentice to take his evidence; but Mr Justice Brett held, although
with some doubt, that Mr Prentice was not authorised by the Act of
Parliament to administer the alternative declaration.[126] The Judge
added that Mr Bradlaugh ought to have liberty to apply to the Court
against the decision, and endorsed his judgment with the opinion that
it was "a fit case to go before the full court."

[Footnote 126: The Evidence Amendment Act 1869 (32 and 33 Vict. c.
68) enacted "that if any person called to give evidence in any court,
whether in a civil or criminal proceeding, shall object to take an
oath, or shall be objected to as incompetent to take an oath, such
person shall, if the presiding judge is satisfied that the taking of
the oath would have no binding effect upon his conscience, make the
promise and declaration the form of which is contained in the same
section." Mr Prentice, as arbitrator, did not consider himself a
"presiding judge" within the meaning of the Act, and was not therefore
qualified to satisfy himself as to the state of a witness's conscience.]

A few days after this refusal of Mr Prentice to hear his evidence,
and Mr Justice Brett's confirmation of this refusal, Mr Bradlaugh
was called as a witness in the Central Criminal Court to prove the
signature of Dr Shorthouse of the _Sporting Times_ in an action for
libel brought by Sir Joseph Hawley. On his objecting to take the oath
he was readily permitted to give his evidence upon affirmation. Such
was the confusion in which the law of evidence was left after the
passing of the Evidence Amendment Act of 1869. A witness perfectly
competent to give evidence in one Court was incompetent in another, or
else it was a matter of doubt whether he was competent or not.

In January 1870 Mr Bradlaug

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